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a b s t r a c t
This paper describes a newcryptanalytic technique that combines differential cryptanalysis
with Shannon entropy. We call it differential entropy (DE). The objective is to exploit the
non-uniform distribution of output differences from a given mapping as a distinguishing
tool in cryptanalysis. Our preferred target is the IDEA block cipher, since we detected
significantly low entropy at the output of itsmultiplication operation.We looked to further
extend this entropy analysis to larger components and for a number of rounds. We present
key-recovery attacks on up to 2.5-round IDEA in the single-key model and without weak-
key assumptions.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The originalmotivation for this paper came from a simple observation: in conventional differential cryptanalysis (DC) [1],
an adversary chooses pairs of plaintexts (P, P∗) with a carefully chosen difference 1P = P ⊕ P∗ that lead to a ciphertext
pair (C, C∗)with a predictable target difference1C = C⊕C∗, with high probability p (compared to a random permutation).
This means that adversaries typically only focus on one or a few high-probability differences1P that lead to difference1C
along a narrow differential trail, which stands out among the other trails which hold with much lower probability.
If the difference 1C does not satisfy certain criteria (filtering conditions, bit patterns, low Hamming weights), then the
pair (P, P∗) is discarded, and another pair is chosen and encrypted. In this way, only the right pairs (P, P∗) that survive the
filtering conditions are collected. Due to the probabilistic nature of the attack, only a fraction of 1/p of the chosen data is
expected to satisfy1C . Consequently, most plaintext pairs are discarded.
Thus, if we do not focus only on the highest probability differential trail, but rather study the probability distribution of
all output differences, then we would not discard any text pair. To measure the shape of a probability distribution, we use
Shannon entropy. We start by analysing a single modular multiplication in IDEA, and then move on to larger components,
such as an MA-box. We are particularly interested in low entropy, which means that the probability distribution is biased
towards a few output differences, while the remaining output differences hold with negligible probability. In contrast, a
random permutation (ormapping over the same domain and range) should have a rather flat probability distribution, which
translates into high entropy values.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lists the contributions of this paper; Section 3.1 briefly describes the IDEA
cipher and its internal structure; Section 3.2 briefly recalls the definition of Shannon entropy and its application to the
probability distribution of output differences; Section 3.3 briefly recalls main aspects of differential cryptanalysis; Section 4
presents a differential entropy (DE) analysis of a single multiplication using xor differences; Section 5 describes attacks on
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: alex.biryukov@uni.lu (A. Biryukov), jorge.nakahara@ulb.ac.be (J. Nakahara Jr.), hmurat@bilkent.edu.tr (H.M. Yıldırım).
0377-0427/$ – see front matter© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cam.2013.08.002
562 A. Biryukov et al. / Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics 259 (2014) 561–570
reduced-round IDEA based on results of Section 4; Section 6 presents a differential entropy analysis of a singlemultiplication
using subtraction difference; Section 7 describes attacks on reduced-round IDEA based on results of Section 6; and Section 8
concludes the paper.
2. Contributions
The main contributions of this paper include the following.
• The combination of differential cryptanalysis and Shannon entropy [2] as a new distinguishing tool for the analysis of
block ciphers such as IDEA [3]. The new technique is called differential entropy (DE).
• In IDEA, allmultiplications are key dependent; that is, one operand is always a round subkey. Therefore, the probability
distribution of output differences for every multiplication is key dependent. But this is not a problem, since DE is an
appropriate tool to measure the shape of the probability distribution of key-dependent differences.
• Notice that the exact value or even the Hamming weight of the differences are not important for entropy computations,
as is often the case in differential cryptanalysis. DE analysis takes into account all possible (output) differences, without
ignoring any of them. Themore skewed/biased the probability distribution, the lower the entropy. In a sense, our analyses
could be interpreted as a kind of low entropy trail analysis similar to that based on a narrow differential trail.
• We employ both exclusive-or and subtraction as difference operators for measuring the differential entropy.
• We demonstrate significantly low differential entropy after a single multiplication, under input difference 8000x, for any
subkey, both using xor and subtraction differences.
3. Preliminaries
This chapter provides well-known definitions and concepts which are mentioned in this paper.
Definition 1. The Hamming weight of a string of bits is the number of 1s in the string.
3.1. IDEA block cipher
The IDEA cipher operates on 64-bit blocks under a 128-bit key and iterates 8.5 rounds (Fig. A.1). IDEA is a design by Lai
and Massey [3], and its main design feature is the use of three group operations on 16-bit words: addition in Z216 (denoted
), bitwise xor (denoted⊕), and multiplication in GF(216+ 1) with 0 ≡ 216 (denoted⊙). Moreover, no operation is applied
twice in a row along the encryption framework. The round structure of IDEA is unique in the sense that (i) there are no
explicit Substitution boxes (S-boxes); (ii) it is neither a Feistel nor an SPN design; (iii) the round function is an involution
which makes the encryption and decryption frameworks very similar except for the reverse order and slightly modified
round subkeys.
The key schedule of IDEA consists of a linear transformation that simply permutes the bits of the 128-bit key. We do not
exploit weak keys/subkeys [4,5] or related keys, and we refer to [3] for further details.
3.2. Shannon entropy
For completeness purposes, we briefly recall the definition of Shannon entropy.
Definition 2. Let X be a (discrete) randomvariable over a finite set {x1, . . . , xn}with probability distribution pi = P(X = xi).
The Shannon entropy of X is a quantitative measure of the amount of information provided by an observation of X:
H(X) = −pi≠0 pi · log2(pi). Note that 0 ≤ H(X) ≤ log2 n.
In the context of differential cryptanalysis, the probability distribution of interest is related to the output difference distri-
bution of a mapping.
Definition 3. The differential entropy of a mapping F : D → R, for finite domain D and finite range R, under input difference
operator⊗, and output difference operator  , is the entropy of the set of output differences corresponding to a fixed input
difference1i. Denote by1o the possible output differences of F . Let p1o(1i) = |{X∈D|F(X) F(X⊗1i)=1o}||D| . Then, for a given1i,
H(F ,1i) = −

1o|p1o (1i)≠0
p1o(1i) · log2(p1o(1i)). (1)
This concept of differential entropy is not the same differential entropy as used in awell-knownbook on Information Theory
by Cover and Joy [6], since it does not concern continuous random variables.
In Sections 4 and 5, we set ⊗ =   = ⊕ as the difference operator. In Section 6, we exploit modular subtraction as the
difference operator. We drop the subscripts1o when it is clear from the context.
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3.3. Differential cryptanalysis
Differential cryptanalysis (DC) is a chosen plaintext technique developed by Biham and Shamir formerly to attack the
DES cipher [1]. The intuition is that for carefully chosen plaintext pairs, (P, P∗), with a given difference 1P = P ⊕ P∗,
the ciphertext pairs, (C, C∗), are expected to have a predictable difference 1C = C ⊕ C∗ with high probability p. This is a
statistical attack requiring O(p−1) chosen plaintexts.
DC has become a general type of attack, and it has been adapted to stream ciphers [7], hash functions [8], and MAC
algorithms [9].
In [10], Albrecht and Leander proposed a model to distinguish between the probability distribution of the right key and
the one for the wrong key. Considering one fixed input difference and all associated differences for block ciphers in which
the subkey gets mixed with the internal state via an xor operation, their model considers multinomial distributions and
suggests better success probabilities against combinations of standard DC and its variants. However, it also comes with
increased time and memory complexities, for instance, exhausting the codebook.
Note that the subkeys of IDEA are involved as operands of the multiplication or the modular addition. In this paper, we
use a new technique, the differential entropy analysis of a single multiplication using xor differences.
For our attacks on IDEA,we exploitwhenever possible somewell-knowndifference values, such as 8000x, that can bypass
modular addition and exclusive-or for free:
(X  Z)⊕ ((X ⊕ 8000x)  Z) = 8000x, ∀Z ∈ GF(216 + 1),
where the subscript x denotes hexadecimal notation. Therefore, 8000x is a fixed point difference for modular addition and
for xor. This way, we can focus only on the multiplications.
Definition 4 ([1]). An i-round differential trail is a sequence of differences (1x1,1x2, . . . ,1xi+1), where 1x1 is the initial
input difference to the first round;1xj is both the output difference observed after the round j− 1 and the input difference
to the round j for j ∈ {2, . . . , i}.
Definition 5 ([1]). The probability of a i-round differential trail or a differential characteristic (1x1,1x2, . . . ,1xi+1) corre-
sponds to the fraction of text pairs that satisfy all differences1xj for i ≤ j ≤ i+ 1, among all possible such pairs.
DC is also a very flexible technique in the sense that there aremany variants based on it or combinedwith othermethods,
such as truncated differentials, impossible differentials, differential-linear [5], boomerang [11], and rectangle attacks. In a
sense, DE is yet another differential-based attack.
4. Differential entropy of a single multiplication
We start by studying a single ⊙. We use whenever possible the wordwise difference 8000x, and make no assumptions
about the subkey value, which we denote simply as Z , when its position is implicit from the context or not relevant. Using
the terminology in (1), the probability distributions of output differences 1o = (X ⊙ Z) ⊕ ((X ⊕ 8000x) ⊙ Z) for some
subkey Z are listed in Table 1. Note that, in this table, not only are very few output differences possible, but the ones that
show up are not uniformly distributed. Some differences aremuchmore probable than others, and this distribution depends
on the subkey value. Plotting a graph of the entropy distribution for all possible 16-bit subkeys in the horizontal axis and the
entropy in the vertical axis, one obtains Fig. A.2. Since themultiplication is over 16-bit inputs, entropy valueswere computed
taking into account all possible input pairs with difference 8000x, exhaustively.
The mirror symmetry in Fig. A.2 provides a lot of information about the entropy behaviour in⊙, such as the following.
• The minimum entropy is zero for the well-known weak subkeys Z ∈ {0000x, 0001x} [4], while the maximum entropy
is 10.444, for Z ∈ {5557x, AAAAx}. Overall, the entropy is significantly low, because only a few output differences are
suggested, and even those that are possible are not uniformly distributed. This observation is valid for any 16-bit subkey
value. The meaning of low is made clear when we compare the entropy with−216−1 1/(216− 1) ∗ log2 1/(216− 1) =
log2(216 − 1) ≈ 15.99, which is expected from a random 16-bit permutation. The lower the entropy, the better the
(entropy-based) distinguisher compared to the expected behaviour for an ideal 16-bit permutation. Apart from IDEA,
we have also examined the xor difference entropy of the AES S-box [12]. The result is that, for any nonzero input xor
difference, the output xor difference entropy is 6.9843. This is a consequence of the fact that the AES S-box is based on a
differentially uniform mapping [13], which makes the probability distribution of output differences flatter and closer to
uniform. Moreover, for the Skipjack S-box [14], the entropy is variable, but is on average 6.557. Both values are close to
the maximum log2 255 ≈ 7.9943 expected from an ideal 8-bit permutation.• The existence of equivalent subkeys from the point of view of differential entropy, that is, subkeys with the same entropy
and the same probability distribution. For instance, the subkeys 8000x and 8001x both have the second lowest entropy,
0.00094254. In general, subkeys Z and 216 + 1 − Z share the same probability distribution, which explains the mirror-
symmetric curve in Fig. A.2. The proof is as follows. Notice that 216 + 1 − Z = −Z = 0 ⊙ Z in GF(216 + 1), since
0 ≡ 216.
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Table 1
Probability distribution of output differences of a single multiplication with input difference 8000x .
Z 1o p1o (8000x) H(⊙, 8000x)
4000x 2000x 65528/216 = 2−0.000176 0.00188
6000x 2−14
e000x 2−14
2000x 1000x 65520/216 = 2−0.000352 0.00364
3000x 2−13
7000x 2−14
f 000x 2−14
1000x 0800x 65504/216 = 2−0.000705 0.00692
1800x 2−12
3800x 2−13
7800x 2−14
f 800x 2−14
(X⊙−Z)⊕((X⊕8000x)⊙−Z) = (X⊙0⊙Z)⊕((X⊕8000x)⊙0⊙Z) = ((X⊙0)⊙Z)⊕(((X⊕8000x)⊙0)⊙Z) = ((−X)⊙
Z)⊕((−(X⊕8000x))⊙Z) = ((10001x−X)⊙Z)⊕((10001x−X−8000x)⊙Z) = ((10001x−X)⊙Z)⊕((8001x−X)⊙Z).
Let Y = 8001x − X . We have
(X ⊙−Z)⊕ ((X ⊕ 8000x)⊙−Z) = ((Y ⊕ 8000x)⊙ Z)⊕ (Y ⊙ Z).
This implies that, under the input difference 8000x, we have the same set of output differences for both Z and−Z . 
In the next section, we use the differential entropy analysis of a singlemultiplication as an effective DE attack on reduced-
round versions of IDEA.
5. DE attacks on IDEA using xor differences
We first attack 1.5-round IDEA starting from an MA half-round with input difference either of the form (8000x, 0000x,
8000x, 0000x) or (0000x, 8000x, 0000x, 8000x). Differences are depicted in red in Fig. A.3. Due to the chosen differences, the
MA-box is bypassed by these differences; that is, the input difference to the first MA-box is (0000x, 0000x) in both cases. The
difference after the next half-round is either (1, 8000x, 0000x, 0000x) or (0000x, 0000x, 8000x, 1), where 1 stands for an
unknown set of differences depending on Z (2)1 or Z
(2)
4 . Let us focus on the case (1, 8000x, 0000x, 0000x), the leftmost scheme
in Fig. A.3. The other case is similar. Whatever1 is, we know from Section 4 that the output difference entropy of1 is low
(Fig. A.2).
We describe two ways to attack 1.5-round IDEA. One can exploit A⊕B, which means the rightmost input to the (second)
MA-box. Note that A⊕B has zero entropy, since the difference is fixed: 8000x. For a random permutation, one would expect
the entropy to be much higher than zero. Therefore, we can distinguish 1.5-round IDEA from a random permutation by just
comparing the entropy at A⊕ B. Alternatively, one can use C ⊕ D and exploit the entropy in1 after Z (2)1 , which is not zero
but still low (compared to that of a random permutation).
Based on these 1.5-round distinguishers, we can further perform key-recovery attacks on 2-round IDEA, recovering (Z (3)3 ,
Z (3)4 ) if we use (A, B) or (Z
(3)
1 , Z
(3)
2 ) if we use (C,D).
Suppose the case of A ⊕ B, whose entropy is zero. This means that there is only a single output difference in A ⊕ B. If
we partially decrypt a half-round by guessing values for (Z (3)3 , Z
(3)
4 ) and further observe two (or more) distinct differences
coming out of A⊕B, then we will be sure that we are not dealing with 2-round IDEA, but rather with a random permutation
(and the guessed subkey values are wrong), because the entropy should be zero. In general, if we expect differential entropy
H at some point, but observe 2H+1 differences, thenwe get a contradiction of the expected entropy. Notice that, according to
Shannon’s formula, H ≤ log2 n, where n is the number of possible output differences. To guarantee that we got differences
fromenoughpairs atA⊕B, we try all 215 possible pairs of 16-bitwordswith difference 8000x at the input. Thedata complexity
becomes 216 chosen plaintexts. The memory complexity is constant. We guess 32 key bits, and partially decrypt one , one
⊙, and perform one ⊕. This costs approximately one fourth of a round. Thus, there are 232 · 216/4 · 1/2 = 245 2-round
computations.
If we use C ⊕ D instead, then we use a structure composed of 215 text pairs of the form {(a, b, c, d), (a ⊕ 8000x, b, c ⊕
8000x, d)}, and encrypt them across 2-round IDEA, as in the rightmost scheme in Fig. A.3. This means 216 chosen plaintexts.
We guess (Z (3)1 , Z
(3)
2 ), and check the entropy after a half-round partial decryption, obtaining a difference C⊕D. If the entropy
of the differences in C ⊕ D is low, then we have potential candidate values for (Z (3)1 , Z (3)2 ). Otherwise, the subkeys guessed
were wrong. The effort is 232 · 216 computations of an , an⊕, and a⊙. This is about the cost of a quarter of a round. Thus,
there are 245 2-round computations.
We can further extend the attack to 2.5-round IDEA. Consider two pools of plaintexts of the form (a, b, c , d) and (a, b,
c ′, d), where c ⊕ c ′ = 8000x, and a ∈ {0, . . . , 216 − 1}; b and d are arbitrary fixed values. Each pool contains 216 chosen
plaintexts. One can form 232 pairs using these pools, and about 216 of these pairs will have difference (8000x, 0000x, 8000x,
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0000x) after the first half-round. This is the input difference and the number of pairs we needed in our previous attack on
2-round IDEA. We recover Z (3)1 , Z
(3)
2 , Z
(3)
3 and Z
(3)
4 , with 2 · 216 chosen plaintexts (CP) and equivalent memory, but there are
64 key bits left to recover. This last step can be performed by exhaustive key search.
6. Differential entropy using subtraction differences
An alternative difference operator for DC is modular subtraction, which, on the one hand, makes differences non-
commutative but, on the other hand, such differences propagate across modular addition for free (i.e. with probability 1).
The differential entropy is computed according to (1) with⊗ =   = −.
Let us first consider a single multiplication. We have output difference 1o = (X ⊙ Z) − ((X − 1i) ⊙ Z), for an input
difference1i and subkey Z .
Fig. A.4 is a similar graph to that of Section 4, but this time usingmodular subtraction as the difference, for arbitrary fixed
subkeys Z . In Fig. A.4, we observe a minimum entropy of zero for Z ∈ {0000x, 0001x} and maximum entropy 1.99996 for
Z ∈ {00D9x, FF28x}, which means there are at most four differences coming out of a single multiplication, whatever the
subkey value. This entropy range is even lower than that observed for xor differences in Fig. A.2.
For the AES s-box, subtraction differences give a maximum entropy of 7.2981, which is higher than the xor entropy in
Section 4.
Moreover, we observe in Fig. A.4 amirror symmetry just like in Fig. A.2. The reason is the following: the output difference
wemeasure now is1o = (X⊙ Z)− ((X −8000x)⊙ Z). Notice that for the subkey 216+1− Z = −Z = 0⊙ Z in GF(216+1)
we have (X⊙−Z)− ((X−8000x)⊙−Z) = (X⊙0⊙ Z)− ((X−8000x)⊙0⊙ Z) = (X⊙ Z)⊙0− ((X−8000x)⊙ Z)⊙0 =
−(X ⊙ Z)  ((X − 8000x)⊙ Z) = −1o. Therefore, the subkeys Z and 216 + 1− Z lead to the same probability distribution,
but the difference values are additive complements: 1o and −1o, respectively. Notice that, for instance, 00D9x and FF28x
are equivalent subkeys, since 00D9x  FF28x = 216 + 1.
Note that the difference value1i = 8000x is very special, because, if a pair of 16-bitwords (X, X∗) satisfy X−X∗ = 8000x,
then X = X∗  8000x, and, since the difference affects only the most significant bit, we have X = X∗ ⊕ 8000x. Thus,
X∗ = X ⊕ 8000x or X∗ = X  8000x; that is, X∗ − X = 8000x. In summary, in the special case1i = 8000x, the subtraction
difference becomes commutative. In general, if X − X∗ = 1, then X = X∗ 1; that is, X∗ − X = −1 = 216 −1. The only
way 216 −1 = 1 in Z216 is if1 = 8000x.
Apart from the duality X  8000x = X ⊕ 8000x that connects operations in Z216 and Z162 , another motivation to invest in
the subtraction difference for entropy analysis is that themodularmultiplication can be viewed simply as repeated addition.
This is made clearer by Lai’s Low–High algorithm [15] for multiplication in GF(216 + 1).
Let a, b ∈ Z216+1, R = ab mod 216, and Q = ab div 216. Then
a⊙ b =

R− Q if R ≥ Q
R− Q + 216 + 1 if R < Q ,
where R denotes the remainder (‘Low’ part) and Q denotes the quotient (‘High’ part) when ab is divided by 216.
The following theorem upper bounds the entropy of a single multiplication using subtraction differences and the input
difference1X = 8000x.
Theorem 1. Let 1X = X − X ′ = 8000x, for X, X ′, Z ∈ Z162 . Then, there are at most four possible output differences 1Y =
X ⊙ Z − (X −1X)⊙ Z. Consequently, the output difference entropy H(1Y ) ≤ 2, ∀Z ∈ Z216 .
The proof of this theorem is in the Appendix.
7. DE attacks on IDEA using subtraction differences
Distinguish-from-random attacks using subtraction difference can be performed just like the attack on 1.5-round IDEA
starting from an MA half-round in Section 5. Let us use, for instance, an input difference of the form (0000x, 8000x, 0000x,
8000x). We refer again to Fig. A.3. Due to the fact that X−X∗ = 8000x is the same as X⊕X∗ = 8000x, the input difference to
the first MA-box is (0000x, 0000x). The difference after the next half-round is (0000x, 0000x, 8000x,1), where1 stands for
an unknown set of up to four differences whose specific values depend on Z (2)4 according to Fig. A.4. Whatever the difference
values in1, we know that the difference entropy of1 is lower than 2.
As in Section 5, one can exploit A⊕ B, which means the leftmost input to the (second) MA-box. Note that A⊕ B has zero
entropy, since the (subtraction) difference is always 8000x. For a random permutation, one would expect the entropy to be
much higher than zero. Therefore, we can distinguish 1.5-round IDEA from a random permutation by just comparing the
entropy of A ⊕ B. Alternatively, one can use C ⊕ D and exploit the entropy in 1 after Z (2)4 , which is not zero but still quite
low (less than 2).
Based on these 1.5-round distinguishers, we can further perform key-recovery attacks on 2-round IDEA, recovering (Z (3)1 ,
Z (3)2 ) if we use (A, B) or (Z
(3)
3 , Z
(3)
4 ) if we use (C,D).
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Table 2
The complexity of attacks on from 2-round to 6-round IDEA.
Rounds Attack Reference Data Timea
2 Differential [16] 210 CP 240
2.5 Differential [4] 210 CP 232
2.5 Diff. entropy Section 5 217 CP 264
2.5 Differential [16] 210 CP 2106
3 Differential-linear [17] 229 CP 244
3.5 Differential [17] 256 CP 267
3.5 Linear [18] 103 KP 297
4 Impossible differential [19] 236.6 CP 266.6
4 Linear [20] 114 KP 2114
4.5 Impossible differential [19] 264 KP 2110.4
5 Demirci–Selçuk–Türe [21] 224 CP 2126
5 Demirci–Selçuk–Türe [22] 224.6 CP 2124
5.5 Key-dependent linear [23] 221 CP 2112.1
6 Key-dependent linear [23] 249 CP 2112.1
CP: chosen plaintext; KP: known plaintext.
a The Timemeasurement unit is the number of associated round computations.
Suppose the case of A ⊕ B, whose entropy is zero. This means that there is only a single output difference in A ⊕ B. If
we partially decrypt a half-round by guessing values for (Z (3)1 , Z
(3)
2 ), and further observe two (or more) distinct differences
in A ⊕ B, then we will be sure we are not dealing with 2-round IDEA, but rather with a random permutation (and the
guessed subkey values arewrong), because the entropy should be zero. In general, ifwe expect differential entropyH at some
point, but observe 2H+1 or more differences, then we get a contradiction of the expected entropy. Notice that, according to
Shannon’s formula, H ≤ log2 n, where n is the number of possible output differences. To guarantee we got all differences at
A⊕B, we try all 215 possible pairs of 16-bit wordswith difference 8000x. The data complexity becomes 216 chosen plaintexts.
Thememory complexity is constant.We guess 32 key bits, and partially decrypt one, one⊙, and perform one⊕. This costs
approximately one fourth of a round. Thus, there are 232 · 216/4 · 1/2 = 245 2-round computations.
If we use C ⊕D instead, then we use a structure composed of 215 text pairs of the form {(a, b, c, d), (a, b⊕ 8000x, c, d⊕
8000x)}, and encrypt them across 2-round IDEA as in the rightmost scheme in Fig. A.3. This means 216 chosen plaintexts.
We guess (Z (3)3 , Z
(3)
4 ), and check the entropy after a half-round partial decryption, obtaining a difference ∇ = C ⊕ D. If the
entropy of the differences in∇ is less than 2, thenwe have potential candidate values for (Z (3)3 , Z (3)4 ). Otherwise, the subkeys
guessed were wrong. The effort is 232 ·216 computations of an, an⊕, and a⊙. This is about the cost of a quarter of a round.
Thus, there are 245 2-round computations.
A similar strategy to that of Section 5 for attacking 2.5-round IDEA can also be used with subtraction differences. Just
notice that for the subtraction difference the entropy after multiplication is at most 2 (lower than for the xor difference).
8. Conclusion
This paper has described a new attack technique called differential entropy, combining differential cryptanalysis with
Shannon entropy. Our target was the IDEA block cipher, due to the heavy use of key-dependent modular multiplication in
GF(216 + 1), which makes the difference distribution of output differences also key dependent. Furthermore, we observed
and sometimes even proved that the entropy can be low for some components, such as⊙, for most of the subkey values.
Our analyses, using xor and subtraction differences, were applied to 2.5-round IDEA.
Table 2 can be used to compare the complexity of attacks on 2.5-round IDEA.
In summary, we exploit the biased probability distribution of output differences in (reduced-round) IDEA cipher, in a
novel way.
Experiments in IDEA-32, a mini version of IDEA operating on 32-bit blocks, exhausting the codebook (232 plaintexts)
and using a difference of the form (00x, 80x, 00x, 80x), for both xor and subtraction differences, indicated that the entropy
increases steadily after 1.5 rounds because of the interaction between the⊕ operation and the subtraction differences after
theMA-box. Thatmeans that, although theMA-box output has low entropy, it is not preserved after the⊕ operationsmixing
the MA-box outputs to the four words in a cipher state at the end of a round. The measured entropy reached values close
to 8 for all four words in the state, which is the maximum for 8-bit words. Thus, we could no longer distinguish reduced-
round IDEA-32 from a random permutation beyond two rounds using DE. We expect the same behaviour in the original
IDEA cipher.
9. Future work and open problems
There are alternative research directions to try.
• One could try to combine entropy with other techniques to detect nonrandom behaviour such as χ2 tests.
• One could attack other ciphers based on IDEA, such as MESH [24] and RIDEA [25].
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Fig. A.1. Computational graph of half-rounds, a full round, and an MA-box of the IDEA cipher.
• We have consistently worked with differences based on xor and subtraction as difference operators. Another possibility
is to use multiplicative differentials [26], or mixed differences [15] such as (−,⊕,⊕,−), that is, a modular subtraction
difference for⊙ and xor differences for .
Acknowledgement
The second author was funded by INNOVIRIS, the Brussels Institute for Research and Innovation, under the ICT Impulse
program CRYPTASC.
Appendix. Proof of Theorem 1
Let A · 216 + B = X ∗ Z and A′ · 216 + B′ = (X − 1X) ∗ Z = (X − 8000x) ∗ Z = (X + 8000x) ∗ Z , where ∗ denotes
multiplication in Z216 . The conversion between multiplication in Z216 and multiplication in GF(216 + 1) is Lai’s Low–High
algorithm
X ⊙ Z =

B− A if B ≥ A
216 + 1+ B− A if B < A.
The representation of X⊙Z in terms of the extended 32-bit value A·216+B allows us to distinguish the influence of the input
difference1X and subkey Z on the distribution of output differences. Let Z = (z15, z14, . . . , z0) and X = (x15, x14, . . . , x0),
with xi, zi ∈ Z2, 0 ≤ i ≤ 15. The distribution of output differences1Y will be analysed in terms of the 16-bit quantities A,
A′, B, and B′. Consider the following cases.
(i) z0 = 1, x15 = 0, x′15 = 1.
(ii) z0 = 1, x15 = 1, x′15 = 0.
(iii) z0 = 0, x15 = 0, x′15 = 1.
(iv) z0 = 0, x15 = 1, x′15 = 0.
The only difference between B and B′ is in the most significant bit, namely, B⊕ B′ = 1X = 8000x. In (i), if z15 = 0, then
B = B′ + 1X , and A′ = A + 1 + Z ≫ 1, where Z ≫ 1 means right shift of Z by one bit (the least significant bit of Z is
discarded). If z15 = 1, then B′ = B+1X , and A′ = A+ Z ≫ 1.
For z15 = 0 the following output differences can result.
• The case B′ ≥ A′ and B ≥ A gives1Y1 = B′ − A′ − (B− A) = B+1X − A− 1− Z ≫ 1− B+ A = 1X − 1− Z ≫ 1.
• The case B′ ≥ A′ and B < A gives1Y2 = B′−A′−(216+1+B−A) = B+1X−A−1−Z ≫ 1−216−1−B+A = 1X−Z ≫ 1.
• The case B′ < A′ and B < A gives1Y = 216 + 1+ B′ − A′ − (216 + 1+ B− A) = 1Y1.
• The case B′ < A′ and B ≥ A cannot happen, because B′ < A′ ⇒ B + 1X < A + Z ≫ 1 ⇒ B < A − 1X + Z ≫ 1 < A.
The last inequality holds because1X > Z ≫ 1, ∀Z ∈ Z162 . This contradicts the assumption that B ≥ A.
For z15 = 1, the possible output differences are identical to 1Y1 (for B′ ≥ A′ and B ≥ A) and 1Y2 (for B′ ≥ A′ and
B < A). The case B′ < A′ and B < A gives 1Y = 1Y1, and, finally, B′ < A′ and B ≥ A cannot happen, because
B′ < A′ ⇒ B + 1X < A + Z ≫ 1 ⇒ B < A − 1X + Z ≫ 1 < A. The last inequality holds because 1X > Z ≫ 1,
∀Z ∈ Z162 . This contradicts the assumption that B < A.
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Fig. A.2. Differential entropy distribution for⊙with input difference 8000x .
Fig. A.3. Attack on reduced-round IDEA using differential entropy of a single multiplication.
The remaining possible output differences are the additive complements of1Y1 and1Y2:1Y3 = 216−1Y1 = 1X+Z ≫
1, and1Y4 = 216 −1Y2 = 1X + 1+ Z ≫ 1. This result comes from the fact that both B′ − A′ ≥ B− A and B′ − A′ < B− A
can occur in the computation of1Y .
In (ii), similarly, changing the roles of A and A′, and of B and B′, if z15 = 0, then B′ = B+1X and A = A′ + 1+ Z ≫ 1; if
z15 = 1, then B = B′ +1X and A = A′ + Z ≫ 1.
For z15 = 0 the possible output differences are as follows.
• The case B′ ≥ A′ and B ≥ A gives1Y1 = B′ − A′ − (B− A) = B+1X − A+ 1+ Z ≫ 1− B+ A = 1X + 1+ Z ≫ 1.
• The case B′ ≥ A′ and B < A gives1Y2 = B′−A′−(216+1+B−A) = B+1X−A+1+Z ≫ 1−216−1−B+A = 1X+Z ≫ 1.
• The case B′ < A′ and B < A gives1Y = 1Y1.
• The case B′ < A′ and B ≥ A cannot happen, because B′ < A′ ⇒ B−1X < A−1−Z ≫ 1⇒ B < A+1X−1−Z ≫ 1 < A.
The last inequality holds because1X > Z ≫ 1, ∀Z ∈ Z162 . This contradicts the assumption that B ≥ A.
In (iii), there is no difference between B and B′, because z0 = 0, and the input difference1X which affects only the most
significant bits ofX andX+1X is not present in the 16 least significant bits of the 32-bit result of conventionalmultiplication.
Two cases are distinguished: (x15 = 0⇔ x′15 = 1)⇒ A′ = A+ Z ≫ 1 or (x15 = 1⇔ x′15 = 0)⇒ A = A′ + Z ≫ 1.
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Fig. A.4. Subtraction entropy distribution of a single⊙with input difference 8000x .
If A′ = A+ Z ≫ 1, then the output differences are as follows.
• The case B′ ≥ A′ and B ≥ A gives1Y1 = B′ − A′ − (B− A) = B− A− Z ≫ 1− B+ A = −Z ≫ 1 = 216 − Z ≫ 1.
• The case B′ ≥ A′ and B < A gives1Y2 = B′ − A′ − (216 + 1+ B− A) = B− A+ Z ≫ 1− 216 + 1− B+ A = Z ≫ 1− 1.
• The case B′ < A′ and B < A gives the difference1Y1.
• The case B′ < A′ and B ≥ A cannot happen, because B′ < A′ ⇒ B < A− Z ≫ 1 < A for Z ∉ {0, 1}. This contradicts the
assumption that B ≥ A.
In (iv), similarly to (iii), changing the roles of A and A′, and of B and B′, the same results follow. 
For some subkeys, there are fewer than four possible output differences. These keys are 0, 1, 2i, 216+ 1− 2i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 15.
For the subkey Z = 1, there is only the output difference1X = 8000x, which corresponds to1Y1 and1Y3. The difference
1Y2 (and1Y4) cannot occur, because A = A′. Thus, the entropy HZ (1Y ) = 0 for Z = 1.
For Z = 0 = 216, the extended multiplication can be viewed with one extra layer corresponding to the 17th bit of Z .
This will imply that only A and A′ will differ (B = B′), namely A − A′ = 1X . Therefore, A > B and A′ > B′, always, and
1Y = 216 + 1+ B′ − A′ − (216 + 1+ B− A) = B′ − A′ − B+ A = A− A′ = 1X . Therefore, the entropy HZ (1Y ) = 1 for
Z = 0.
For Z = 2i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 15, there can be only two possible output differences. Notice that z0 = 0; that is, all these subkeys
are even valued. The differences1Y2 (and consequently1Y4) cannot happen, because B′ ≥ A′, B < A, and B′ = B imply that
A > B = B′ ≥ A′, but, since A′ = A+ Z ≫ 1, it follows that A′ < A, which contradicts the assumption that A′ = A+ Z ≫ 1,
for Z > 1. The possible differences are1Y1 = 216 − Z ≫ 1 = 216 − 2i−1 and1Y3 = Z ≫ 1 = 2i−1. Similarly, the additive
complements of subkeys that are powers of 2 also generate only two output differences. They correspond to Z = 216 − 2i,
1 ≤ i ≤ 15. Notice that all of these subkeys are odd valued (z0 = 1). The differences1Y2 (and1Y4) cannot happen, because
B′ ≥ A′, B < A, and B′ = B+1X imply thatA+1X > B+1X = B′ ≥ A′, but, on the other handA = A′+1+Z ≫ 1 ≤ A′+1X .
This is a contradiction. The possible differences are1Y1 = 1X − Z ≫ 1 and its additive complement1Y3 = 1X + Z ≫ 1.
Therefore, except for Z ∈ {0, 2i, 216−2i}, 0 ≤ i ≤ 15, there are exactly four output differences1Y = X⊙Z−(X−1X)⊙Z
for 1X = 8000x. It follows that the output entropy HZ (1Y ) = 2. These output differences and their distribution can
be denoted as (1Y1, 216p1), (1Y2, 216p2), (1Y3, 216p3), (1Y4, 216p4), where pi is the probability of occurrence of the ith
difference, and
4
i=1 pi = 1. The value pi are key dependent. Moreover,1Y3 = 216−1Y1, which implies that1Y3 and1Y1
occur equally often (p3 = p1), and similarly p2 = p4.
Another symmetry in the distribution is that p1 + p2 = 12 . The output entropy HZ (1Y ) can, therefore, be considerably
simplified:
HZ (1Y ) = −
4
i=1
pi · log pi = −2 · p1 · log2 p1 − 2 · (1/2− p1) · log2(1/2− p1).
As noticed before, for subkeys Z that are powers of 2, the following equality holds:
HZ (1Y ) = H216+1−Z (1Y ),
where1X = 8000x.
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